Page 13 - 2022 - Q4 - Minerva in Focus

to the updraught emanating from the forecastle store through the (Figure 4). He made his way to advise the Bosun of the chief of-
access hatch coaming, securing the access with a canvas cover alone ficer’s location.
was found to be problematic. Therefore, the Bosun was sent to get The Chief Officer was evacuated to the ship’s hospital by stretcher,
some plywood, and he went back into the forecastle store. where it was found that he had a broken leg and severe chest and
Meanwhile, the two ABs refitted the spurling pipe covers, which head injuries. He succumbed to his injuries later that day.
had also been washed off and then went to secure the damaged
hatch lid under the windlass. Shortly afterwards, with the ABs
standing on either side of the damaged hatch lid ready to lift it,
and the chief officer standing forward of them (Figure 2), facing
aft, one of the ABs felt the bow notably lift and spotted a large
wave approaching. The AB shouted a warning, and although he
held on tight to a forestay, the force of the wave that crashed onto
the forecastle tore his grip from the forestay and washed him over
the windlass, and he crashed against a mooring winch behind.
The other AB was washed against the windlass on the port side,
suffering leg injuries, and the chief officer was washed under the
windlass (Figure 3). Although stunned and having sustained a head
injury, the AB who had been washed over the windlass called out
to his colleagues and, upon receiving no reply, believed they had
been washed overboard. He went to find the Bosun, who sub-
sequently sent him to notify the bridge that they had personnel
overboard. The bridge then sounded the man overboard alarm and
commenced a Williamson turn. While the search for the two appar- Figure 3: Paths taken by crew members after being hit by the wave.
ently missing men commenced, the second AB on the forecastle
recovered slightly and found the chief officer under the windlass

Lessons Learned with each successive wave crashing across the access hatch.
The hatch cover had also been torn off around six months
previously, so to try and stop this from happening again, a
• The chief officer had not told the captain and bridge watch- pad eye had been welded onto the underside of the hatch to
keeper of the damage or his intention to proceed to the fore- connect to a rung of the ladder underneath with a bottle screw
castle to investigate and then make temporary repairs. (Figure 5). On this occasion, the additional securing device had
• No one in the repair party took a radio with them to maintain not been fitted. When the hatch cover was repaired in port
contact with the bridge. following the fatal incident, the hatch was rotated 180⁰ and the
• Access to the main deck had not been restricted, as it was be- hinge fitted on the forward side of the coaming/hatch.
lieved the weather had slightly improved. However, in reality, it • The reason that the water ingress was seen initially by the
still posed a considerable risk to personnel on deck. electrician was that the watertight door at the forward end
• No risk assessment had been carried out prior to the chief of the port underdeck passage into the forecastle had been
officer, and later the chief officer and three crew members, left open. These doors were regularly left open on the vessel,
proceeding to the forecastle. negating its watertight integrity if the forward part of the ves-
• As the bridge team was unaware of the crew on the forecastle sel were to be damaged. Furthermore, there were no warning
conducting repair efforts, the vessel’s course and speed were signs on the doors advising that these should be kept closed
not altered to reduce the risk of seawater on deck. at sea, except for access.
• There was confusion in relation to the reports of crew over-
board, as a crew member, in a time of high stress and shock,
reverted to his mother tongue and could not be understood by
the bridge watchkeeper, which led to uncertainty as to whether
personnel had been washed overboard.
• Τhe telephone system was made inoperable when one hand-
set was left “off the hook”, which had also happened twice
the previous day with telephone handsets displaced due to
the heavy weather. This hampered the bridge watchkeeper’s
ability to contact the captain following the reports of a man
overboard.
• The securing dogs on the access hatch had been fitted by the
Bosun upon departure from Melbourne. However, they had
Figure 4: Location where Figure 5: Additional forecastle
only been secured hand-tight. The access hatch cover hinges
the chief officer was found access hatch securing device
were on the aft side of the hatch, and therefore any lack of
under the windlass
tightness would have made the hatch susceptible to damage Μarine Incident Investigation
Unit - Αustralia
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