Page 32 - 2024 - Q2 - Minerva in Focus

MINERVA IN FOCUS Stay Safe

Case Study:

Engine Room Fire

aboard Containership

(The incident occurred on a
vessel of another company)

CO system to extinguish the fire was such that
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a specialised marine firefighter concluded it “was
just textbook perfect”. Under guidance and with
assistance from the marine firefighting team, the
crew slowly began naturally ventilating the space
by opening vents and hatches to clear the volatile
organic compounds. By the next morning, the
engine room was deemed safe for entry.
Figure 1: CCTV screen captures of the main engine showing fuel spray in
the area around the no. 5 cylinder the moment the fire started, and the The cause
progression (time stamps are 4 hours ahead).
The probable cause of the engine room fire was a
On a spring afternoon, a partially loaded contain- crewmember insufficiently swaging a compression
ership was underway at a speed of 17.5 knots with fitting ferrule during the installation of fuel oil return
the main engine operating at 68 rpm. At about tubing for a main engine’s cylinder, allowing an
01:24, ultra-low sulfur diesel fuel began spraying end of the tubing to disconnect and spray fuel oil
in the area around the main engine’s no. 5 cylinder. onto a nearby unshielded and uninsulated cylinder
The leak was recorded by CCTV footage (Figure exhaust component.
1), which went unnoticed as the engine room
was unattended at the time. Unfortunately, the The outcome
Figure 2: Cylinder no. 5 containership did not have CCTV video analytic As a result of the fire, the vessel lost propulsion
and the disconnected, newly
installed fuel oil return technology integrated into the existing system to and drifted for several hours before being towed.
tubing (inset). identify fuel mist in real time and alert the crew. Fortunately, no pollution or injuries were reported
At about 01:54, an AB on watch noticed smoke among the 22 crewmembers. The damage to the
coming from an open engine room hatch, and the vessel was estimated at $8.22 million.
vessel’s fire-detection and alarm systems were
activated. Within 10 minutes, the crewmembers
were fully mustered, and the fire teams had run Lessons Learnt:
out fire hoses and started boundary cooling. The
crew had the foresight to quickly close the upper Rapid oil leak-detection systems
deck engine room hatch, and they coordinated are a valuable tool that can be
and activated fuel oil shutoffs and ventilation shut- used to prevent fire in machinery
downs to subdue the fire by limiting oxygen and spaces and therefore video
fuel to the space. analytic technology must be
The captain clearly communicated with the Coast available onboard.
Guard and vessel management ashore so that a
coordinated emergency response could be quickly In case of engine room fire, it
arranged. The fire teams made two controlled en- is important to contain the
tries into the engine room and identified the fire as spread of the fire by removing
being too large to be fought using fire hoses. Then, fuel and oxygen sources, cooling
they released the fixed CO system in a controlled boundaries, and communicating
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manner, continuously monitoring the space, ensur- effectively.
ing that all ventilation sources to the engine room
remained secured, conducting boundary cooling,
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and allowing the CO to function as designed. Source: Safer Seas Digest,
The crew’s response to the fire was timely and National Transportation
effective, and their activation of the ship’s fixed Safety Board (NTSB)

30 ISSUE 28 / Q2 2024