Page 28 - 2023 - Q4 - Minerva in Focus

STAY SAFE

Case Study: Tanker Grounding

and Ineffective Communication

(This incident refers to a 3rd party vessel)

Lessons Learnt

• An acute awareness of
the environment and all
existing conditions is
essential.
• Communication between
vessels must always be

precise and ongoing.

Image 1: Positions of the vessels (approx-
imate scale) in the Carrollton Bend in the
minutes leading up to the casualty

The incident its section of the river bend. On the other The tanker’s pilot issued multiple helm
An early spring morning, a tanker was trans- hand, the towing vessel’s pilot, agreed to orders and sounded the ship’s whistle,
iting downbound on the Lower Mississippi the overtaking and did not seek clarifica- attempting to avert a collision. He an-
River. At about 09:06, having discharged tion on the intended location, assuming it nounced over the radio that the tanker
cargo at a designated location, the tanker would take place after the bend. was “colliding at Nine Mile” and requested
got underway downbound during high-riv- harbor tug assistance. Continuing to give
er conditions with a following current. A Considering the speed of the tanker and multiple rudder orders, he ordered the en-
few hours later, the master went below to the large course alterations both down- gine to full astern to maneuver the tanker
rest in his cabin, leaving the second officer bound vessels had to make to round Nine clear of the towing vessel.
and the helmsman on watch together with Mile Point with a following current amid
the pilot and the pilot observer. other traffic, the bend presented an in- As a result, at 15:21 the vessel momentarily
creased risk. grounded on the left descending bank be-
Ahead of the tanker (red vessel at Image fore it continued along the bank. Seconds
1) was a towing vessel (yellow vessel at Still, a mishap would have been avoided, later, the port side of the tanker struck a
Image 1), which was pushing two empty hadn’t the towing vessel slid into the path spud barge, which was part of a fender
hopper barges breasted side by side and of the overtaking tanker. The slide was system to protect the river intake pipes.
was also traveling downbound in the fol- likely caused by the current and wind pres- At 15:22, the pilot ordered the starboard
lowing current. As the tanker approached sure on the tow’s empty barge. The towing anchor let go. As the tanker slowed in the
the nine-mile point (see image), its pilot vessel’s pilot, who was alone in the wheel- bend, the tanker struck another protective
communicated at 15:02 with the towing house, failed to communicate the evolving spud barge for another set of river intake
vessel, which was about 1.7 miles ahead, situation over the radio to both the tanker pipes.
indicating the intention to overtake it. and the other surrounding vessels. He
could not maintain the tow’s position in The incident was not the cause of any pol-
Despite the exchange between the tanker’s the center of the river, nor power or steer lution or injuries, but the cumulative dam-
pilot and the towing vessel’s pilot, the it out of the slide in sufficient time to allow age to the tanker and the fender systems
specific location for the overtaking maneu- adequate space for the fast-approaching amounted to a significant cost.
ver was not specified. The tanker’s pilot tanker, which was traveling about double
assumed each vessel would stay within the speed of the towing vessel. Source: NTSB Safer Seas Digest

28 MINERVA IN FOCUS – ISSUE 26 / Q4 2023